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GENDERED VIOLENCE 
AND INDIA’S  BODY POLITIC
The paradox of rape is that it has a long history and occurs across all countries, yet its meaning can best be grasped through an analysis of specific social, cultural and political environments. Feminist writing on citizenship and the state 
has long noted the relevance of women’s bodies as reproducers of the 
nation; it is equally important to think about the uses of the sexed body 
in a political context. A consideration of gendered violence as part of a 
continuum of embodied assertions of power can not only tell us how 
masculine supremacy is perpetuated through tolerated repertoires of 
behaviour, but also help us to understand how forms of class, kinship 
and ethnic domination are secured—and what happens when they are 
disrupted. Rape, Joanna Bourke has observed, is a form of social perfor-
mance, the ritualized violation of another sexed body.1 This is no less 
true for such apparently depoliticized though grievous forms of violence 
as the now infamous gang rape of Jyoti Singh, a young woman returning 
from a night out in New Delhi in December 2012. 
In a country where complacency about sexual assault has been the 
norm, the uproar that followed suggested that an unspoken limit had 
been crossed. Mass protests across India expressed a very political and 
public anger with the institutional apathy and impunity of the estab-
lishment. The mobilization of feminist groups and youth during this 
episode succeeded in generating a momentum for change, not least 
by challenging the stigma associated with reporting rape. After 2012, 
reported rape increased, although that appears to have reached a pla-
teau. A raft of laws, drafted in consultation with feminist lawyers and 
women’s groups, has expanded the definition of rape to include other 
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forms of violence and harassment, such as stalking and acid-throwing. 
Yet the best law in the world cannot solve the problem without adequate 
institutional and cultural reform. In a country where, it is said, many 
women experience a ‘continuum of violence . . . from the womb to the 
tomb’, evidence of the systemic character of assaults ‘widely tolerated 
by the state and community’ suggests we need an understanding of the 
institutional conditions that normalize this violence.2 What locations 
do women’s bodies occupy within India’s systems of caste, kinship 
and state domination? How have neoliberalization and consumerism 
transformed older practices of sexual coercion and patriarchal norms? 
Given the highly ideological nature of Western representations of sexual 
violence in the Global South, what might we learn by placing India in 
a comparative frame? 
A long history 
Reflection on gendered violence in India reveals a constant pattern 
of impunity and silence, forged within the broader political economy 
of hierarchy and devaluation. Gang rape is but one of many forms of 
assault routinely committed against women in India, including domes-
tic and dowry-related violence, sex-selective abortion, stalking and street 
harassment—euphemistically known as ‘Eve teasing’—and military or 
custodial rape. These public and private mechanisms of control largely 
operate with impunity, relying on notions of honour and shame to con-
ceal the actual extent of the harm. In all too many cases, rape victims 
go on to commit suicide. The birth of the modern Republic of India, 
through Partition and Independence in 1947, was itself accompanied 
by widespread gang rape and the abduction of women, later cloaked in 
secrecy. It has taken painstaking work by feminist historians to excavate 
and expose the extent to which sexual violence was involved in the very 
formation of the two nations, India and Pakistan.3 It is mainly through 
oral history and literature, notably the compelling stories of Saadat 
Hasan Manto, that we can see how national honour in the new-born 
states was tied to the desecration of women’s bodies and the ensuing 
1 Joanna Bourke, Rape: A History from 1860 to the Present, London 2007, p. 6.
2 Rashida Manjoo, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, Its 
Causes and Consequences, United Nations 2015.
3 Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices From the Partition of India, 
Durham, nc 2000.
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narratives of rescue from the enemy. Rape myths in India still pitch the 
lascivious Muslim male against the hapless Hindus, who must defend 
their women by rooting out the aggressor.
Since 1947, sexual violence against minority and lower-caste women has 
increasingly been used to consolidate cross-caste Hindu alliances. In 
the pogrom led by the ruling Hindutva right in Gujarat in 2002, large 
numbers of Muslim women were gang-raped, as were many hundreds 
in the Mumbai pogroms fomented by the nativist Shiv Sena in 1992–
93.4 In neither case has a single perpetrator been charged with sexual 
crimes. Paul Brass has argued that violence in South Asian communal 
conflict is a type of performance, a routinized repertoire of politics in 
which all parties are complicit, and that this is prepared, rehearsed and 
perpetrated by well-organized agents constituting an ‘institutionalized 
riot machine’.5 While his account fails to consider the increasing use of 
gendered assault in communal conflict, it is clear that rapes formed part 
of this repertoire of violence in Gujarat and Mumbai, designed to terrify 
and humiliate Muslims at a time when the bjp’s electoral victory hung 
in the balance. In this sense, Muslim women’s bodies were the mat-
erial and symbolic terrain on which a hegemonic cross-caste Hindutva 
identity was affirmed.
Gang rape has also been used as an intermittent but powerful tactic of 
social control in a changing political landscape where lower castes have 
mobilized against historic caste discrimination. The subordination of 
mainly Dalit (former Untouchable) cultivators and landless labourers 
has historically been achieved through everyday forms of intimidation 
and control. The 1980s were characterized by intense armed struggle 
between upper castes and Dalits, then organized in the radical Naxalite 
movement; gang rape was often a punishment for Dalit resistance. Since 
then, the agrarian structure in northern and western India has changed, 
partly as a result of the Green Revolution, which saw the system of land-
lordism that had long underpinned wheat cultivation partially replaced 
by a new agrarian elite that emerged from the historically subordinate 
4 Human Rights Watch, We Have No Orders to Save You: State Participation and 
Complicity in Communal Violence in Gujarat, 2002; Human Rights Watch, India: 
Communal Violence and the Denial of Justice, 1996.
5 Paul Brass, The Production of Hindu–Muslim Violence in Contemporary India, 
Seattle 2004.
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(but not Untouchable) ‘Other Backward Classes’. In recent reports of 
sexual violence, it is obc men who have been charged with raping Dalit 
women. In March 2014, for example, four Dalit girls were abducted and 
gang-raped by Jat men in the state of Haryana (Jats are considered upper-
caste but have been agitating for inclusion in the list of obcs to gain 
access to quotas in government jobs and education).6 This was one of 
several cases of gang rape reported from Haryana in 2014, each reveal-
ing a degree of collusion between caste groups, village headmen and the 
police. In an earlier case in the state of Maharashtra, a Dalit family in 
the village of Khairlanji was subjected to a long campaign of intimida-
tion and harassment by obc families intent on seizing control of their 
land. In September 2001, a large obc group that included both men 
and women, armed with sticks, axes, chains and iron rods, attacked 
the household. The men were beaten to death, while the women were 
gang-raped and then killed. This is one of many examples of the almost 
ritualistic gendered violence that characterizes land grabs and reactions 
to the perceived hubris of Dalit families when they resist. 
This continuum of violence is indeed reproduced, even as women 
potentially win new freedoms in the context of India’s ongoing devel-
opment. The Delhi gang rape in 2012 and other similar assaults since 
then testify to the levels of sexual violence in India’s cities, where the 
contradictions of unbridled masculinity and class polarization come 
under explosive pressure. Yet such evidence can quickly become the 
stuff of political myth-making. ‘Rapes occur in India, not Bharat’, pro-
claimed Mohan Bhagwat, leader of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, 
the bjp’s militant wing.7 Bharat, the Hindi name for the country, evokes 
an idealized village India. Yet the data, however unreliable, shows one 
unambiguous pattern: violence against women is still primarily rural. 
This in part reflects the fact that India’s rate of urbanization has been 
slower than, for example, China’s or Brazil’s: 68 per cent of India’s pop-
ulation still live in rural areas, compared with 49 per cent in China and 
only 15 per cent in Brazil. Myths about dangerous cities, which may to 
some extent represent anxieties about Westernization, also enable the 
surveillance of women and curtailment of their freedoms—and help to 
place the burden of responsibility on women themselves. The material 
accoutrements of the modern self in neoliberalizing India—jeans and 
6 Aradhna Wal, ‘Reliving a nightmare’, The Hindu, 17 May 2014.
7 ‘Rapes Occur in India, not Bharat: rss Supremo Bhagat’, Times of India, 4 January 
2013.
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mobile phones—have been cited as the cause of crimes against women.8 
These views are most frequently proclaimed by the Hindu Right and 
patriarchal caste elders in village panchayats, who pit the authenticity of 
rural India against a corrupt, urban India in moral decline.9 The evidence 
in fact suggests that much violence against Indian women is rooted in 
rural caste dynamics, especially the age-old struggle for land and control 
of lower-caste labour. Once normalized, however, the cultural represen-
tations arising from such stark and coercive inequality can reproduce 
themselves freely, with the circulation of images and people—the last 
two decades have seen unprecedented, largely male migration within 
India—making it increasingly difficult to think of sexual violence in ter-
ritorially bounded ways. 
Dynamics of son preference 
All four attackers in the Delhi gang rape came from the northern states of 
Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, or Rajasthan in the west, which have the worst 
record for rape and sexual assault among Indian states. Historically, 
gendered violence has been most prevalent in these regions, with their 
starkly unequal caste and landholding structures, low rates of female 
labour-force participation and correspondingly low valuation of girls 
and women. Forming part of the ‘Bermuda Triangle’ of low female-to-
male sex ratios and high levels of gender disparity, these states have 
exemplified the adverse gender norms in the wheat-producing north, 
compared with the rice-growing south. Research through the dec-
ades has shown a sharp distinction between the northern ‘patriarchal 
zones’—characterized by rigid caste hierarchies, unequal landholding 
and a history of state–landlord collusion—and the southern states, where 
women play an important role in rice cultivation, meaning that a higher 
value is set on their labour and gender norms are less misogynistic. 
The comparison between kinship structures and gender relations north 
and south has been much discussed since the 1980s.10 Son preference 
8 A caste council recently banned mobile phones for girls under the age of eighteen, 
citing their use in forming relationships with boys and ‘inviting’ crimes against 
them: Times of India, 19 February 2016.
9 International Human Rights Clinic, uc Berkeley, School of Law, Access to Justice for 
Women: India’s Response to Sexual Violence and Conflict in Upheaval, October 2015.
10 This divide was much discussed after Barbara Miller’s The Endangered Sex: Neglect 
of Female Children in Rural North India, Oxford 1981.
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is at the core of kinship systems in the north. This has traditionally been 
explained by the underlying political economy which values men’s work 
while devaluing women’s productive labour. Rural female labour-force 
participation in India has been declining since the 1990s, partly because 
mechanization and the growth of manufacturing have replaced the type 
of labour that women used to perform.11 In this context the availability 
of ultrasound technology at family-planning clinics, making it possible 
to determine the gender of a foetus before opting for abortion, has had 
dire effects on the sex ratio. Since Amartya Sen’s ground-breaking study 
of India’s ‘missing women’ appeared in 1990, there is evidence that sex 
ratios have been falling at an even faster rate.12 In 2011, India’s sex ratio 
at birth was the second lowest among Asian countries, at 944 women 
per 1,000 men, with China the lowest at 926.13 Many studies have related 
this to norms prevailing across the ‘classic belt of patriarchy’, including 
North Africa and the Middle East, where gender relations are broadly 
characterized by patrilineal descent and inheritance, control of mobil-
ity for women in the public realm and low levels of female labour-force 
participation. However, sex ratios are actually more favourable—and fer-
tility levels higher—in the Middle East and North Africa; nor does this 
approach explain why Indian sex ratios have been declining over time, or 
why they seem to be worsening in specific districts. These cases seem 
to call for a combination of structural and regionally specific explana-
tions. The common factors emerging from localized studies suggest that 
the changing socio-economic circumstances of specific castes—caused 
by shifts in agriculture, land-tenure patterns and the value of female 
labour, combined with escalating dowry demands—have been primarily 
to blame for sex selection.14
11 N. V. Varghese, ‘Women and Work: An Examination of the Female Marginalization 
Thesis in the Indian Context’, Indian Journal of Labour Economics, vol. 34, no. 3, 
1991. There is, of course, variation in this pattern. In some areas of Haryana, for 
example, women continue to do wage labour while men tend their own land. But 
women are paid less than men for their labour, which reinforces their subordinate 
position even when they are working outside the home.
12 Amartya Sen, ‘More than 100 Million Women Are Missing’, New York Review of 
Books, 20 December 1990.
13 Census of India, Provisional Results ‘Gender Composition’, 2011, censusin-
dia.gov.in/2011-prov-results. In China, female labour force participation (flfp) 
has been consistently higher than in India at around 64 per cent. This anomaly 
between high flfp and low sex ratio can be partly explained by the one-child policy, 
which has led to a much stricter application of son preference.
14 un Women, Sex Ratios and Gender Biased Sex Selection: History, Debates and 
Future Directions, New Delhi 2014.
desai: Gendered Violence 73
‘Girl aversion’ is rooted in the calculus of the market: young brides are 
now expected to be more educated than before, requiring the expense 
of school fees; yet the falling demand for female labour, especially in 
white-collar and public-sector jobs, provides few opportunities for them 
to make good on this investment. Dowry demands have also increased 
with the cross-class rise in consumerism. For parents, a girl is a burden 
and a poor investment.15 It is from this ‘son preference’ that other con-
sequences for gender hierarchies flow, from female infanticide to poor 
nutrition for girls, worse healthcare and less schooling. Again, some 
indicators show a sharp north–south distinction, which may reflect his-
torical, long-term differences—for instance, the female literacy rate in 
Kerala is 92 per cent, compared to 51 per cent for women in Bihar. There 
are far more ‘missing women’ in the north: according to the 2011 Census 
of India, in Uttar Pradesh there are 858 women to every 1,000 men, a 
figure that has worsened over the past two decades, while Kerala has a 
sex ratio of 1,058 women to every 1,000 men.
However, the historically established north–south contrast may be shift-
ing, as emerging economic inequalities no longer conform to state 
boundaries; urban areas have in general become significantly richer, 
while huge disparities have emerged in rural India, and there are con-
sequently sharp intra-state disparities in growth and inequality levels. 
This means that gender hierarchies are now following patterns of class 
and caste stratification, with growing consumerism and aspiration 
fuelling dowry-related violence and possibly the reinforcement of intra-
household gender power. Feminist scholars and activists in India have 
documented the diffusion of son preference to communities, classes 
and castes elsewhere in the country, including southern India, so girl 
aversion is no longer merely a ‘northern problem’.16 Indeed, reports sug-
gest that sex selection began in urban India—some of the worst child sex 
ratios are in cities—though the practice has now spread to many rural 
districts, where it tends to be more closely studied. If this is true, some 
of the earlier explanations of the patriarchal practices centred on north–
south distinctions and types of agriculture may need to be modified in 
light of the circulation of technologies, and the complex transformations 
in local economies under neoliberalization that are giving rise to new 
caste and class hierarchies.
15 un Women, Sex Ratios, p. 26.
16 un Women, Sex Ratios, p. 30.
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The surplus of men generated through practices of girl aversion 
is a demographic trend in India, as it is in China, both of which are 
estimated to see about 30 million surplus men in twenty years’ time.17 
Some researchers have argued that males in these ‘bare-branch’ societies 
will ‘seek satisfaction through vice and violence’; increased aggression 
to capture resources in a competitive environment will become the 
norm.18 ‘An entire class of potentially angry, frustrated, relatively poor 
and un educated single men can mean serious threats to societal stabil-
ity, if this group builds a class identity that feels antagonized by society 
as a whole’, as one recent writer put it.19 The rise of ‘bachelor nations’ is 
portrayed as a new security threat: the cia’s World Factbook collects sex-
ratio data by country, on the assumption that disproportions ‘may cause 
unrest among young adult males who are unable to find partners’.20 
In the futuristic film Matrubhoomi: A Nation Without Women, the dire 
effects of female infanticide are represented in all-male villages. 
There is a streak of catastrophism in many bare-branch predictions. 
But the case of Bangladesh—a Muslim country—shows that concerted 
action and commitment can change what appears to be an irreversible 
trend. Bangladesh used to share kinship patterns with the north-Indian 
patriarchal belt, but since the 1990s the statistics show a steady decline 
in the discrimination against girls in health and nutrition, with con-
sequently better implications for under-five mortality. Indeed, there is 
now little evidence of sex-selective abortion or daughter aversion there. 
Scholars have suggested that this surprising pattern springs from the 
steady rise in economic growth in the country during the 1990s, which 
together with the lowering of fertility and rising women’s education, has 
increased the value placed on daughters.21 But the key factor seems to be 
the rise in female labour-force participation, which by 2014 was around 
58 per cent, above the world average of around 50 per cent and double 
that of India, with only 27 per cent.22 The participation of women in 
17 Andrea Den Boer and Valerie Hudson, ‘A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace’, 
International Security, vol. 26, no. 4, 2002.
18 Den Boer and Hudson, ‘A Surplus of Men, A Deficit of Peace’.
19 Kevin Lee, ‘China’s Problem of Too Many Single Men’, Forbes, 13 May 2011.
20 cia World Factbook 2016.
21 Naila Kabeer, Lopita Huq and Mahmud Simeen, ‘Diverging Stories of “Missing 
Women” in South Asia: Is Son Preference Weakening in Bangladesh?’, Feminist 
Economics, vol. 20, no. 4, 2014.
22 See ‘Labour force participation rate, female (% of female population aged 15+) 
(modeled ilo estimate)’, World Bank website.
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state employment, ngo micro-credit programmes and labour-intensive, 
export-oriented industries in Bangladesh offers a stark contrast to India, 
where women’s participation in formal work has failed to increase as 
predicted by economists, and there are no clear strategies aimed at 
reversing this trend. 
One of the murkier aspects of gendered violence in India is the com-
bined problem of under-reporting and institutional collusion that 
suppresses the extent of such crimes. As elsewhere, when data show a 
spike in violence, it is usually unclear whether this has been caused by 
increased reporting or whether there has been an actual rise. Official 
statistics are unreliable, not just because of under-reporting but also due 
to unreliable recording practices and, worse, collusion. A good indicator 
of the prevalence of gender-based power is domestic violence, which 
remains relatively unexplored in the literature. Studies on family and 
intimate-partner assault in India, collected through independent schol-
arship and ngo surveys, show it to be widespread. A survey in 2013 
found that 27 per cent of women in a nationally representative sample 
had experienced intimate partner violence.23 Another survey of young 
women in a Bangalore slum revealed that 56 per cent of study partici-
pants had experienced domestic violence.24 Feminist researchers have 
shown that two major factors—son preference and dowry demand—
are the most important determinants of gender power in the household 
and consequently of the probability of violence. It is not the size of 
the dowry that puts women at risk—it may provide some financial 
resources for women—but the dissatisfaction and demands for more 
by the husband’s family. Indeed, there is in the South Asian context a 
long-standing and relatively under-analysed inversion of gender power, 
whereby mothers-in-law, once victimized by such exactions, become 
key players in the perpetuation of abuse and violence centred on dowry 
demands. The Bangalore study found, somewhat counterintuitively, 
that assault was more prevalent in ‘love’ marriages: women who chose 
to marry outside their caste and community, often in violation of their 
parents’ wishes, were generally more vulnerable to domestic violence, 
23 Priya Nanda et al., ‘Masculinity, Intimate Partner Violence and Son Preference in 
India’, International Centre for Research on Women, New Delhi, 2014.
24 Corinne Rocca et al., ‘Challenging Assumptions About Women’s Empowerment: 
Social and Economic Resources and Domestic Violence Among Young Married 
Women in Urban South India’, International Journal of Epidemiology, vol. 38, no. 2, 
2009.
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committed not just by their partners, but by members of their own 
family—over 56 per cent of women who had made independent choices 
in marriage partners had been beaten, kicked or disowned by family 
members.25 Gendered violence may, in recent times, reflect a backlash 
against women’s increasing desire to choose marriage partners and 
resist some of the older forms of community and parental domination 
imposed on them.
Conflict zones
Since independence in 1947, the Indian state has been engaged in almost 
perpetual armed conflict with insurgent groups along its borders, rang-
ing from Kashmir to self-determination movements in the north-east, 
as well as battling rural Maoists in the eastern states. The proliferation 
of security forces in these areas has brought about increased insecurity 
for women. Sexual violence in all these cases is rife, but rarely prose-
cuted. Kashmir and Punjab, both sites of Partition violence in 1947, and 
of the state repression of insurgent movements in the 1980s and 90s, 
have seen sexual assault used to ‘punish’ women accused of harbour-
ing terrorists. Investigations into these incidents are hampered by the 
police, who fail to collect evidence, physicians who refuse to treat raped 
women, and a judicial system that often delays proceedings for five years 
or more, creating a dangerous and traumatizing waiting period for vic-
tims and their families.26
In 1989 a woman accused of protecting terrorists in her home in Punjab 
was arrested and raped in her cell. When she reported the crime, physi-
cians refused to examine her, and the criminal procedure took almost 
eight years and eighty court hearings, during which time she was forced 
to live in hiding, as police officers torched her home and harassed her 
family.27 When Kashmir was declared a ‘disturbed area’ in 1990, the 
Armed Forces (Jammu and Kashmir) Special Powers Act gave military 
officers unprecedented rights to enter, search, arrest and seize without 
warrant, with force ‘even to the causing of death’. In 1991, armed forces 
cordoned off two villages in the north-west of Kashmir and removed 
the men while soldiers, reportedly reeking of alcohol, gang-raped the 
25 Rocca et al., ‘Challenging Assumptions’.
26 Access to Justice for Women, p. 31.
27 Access to Justice for Women, p. 21.
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women. Despite ‘an entire village of eye-witness reports’—plus torn 
clothes, discarded bottles, and so on—the case was closed by the police, 
citing ‘insufficient evidence’.
The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act (1958), originally designed 
to legitimate repression of ‘disturbances’ in Nagaland, has since pro-
vided the legal framework for counterinsurgency operations in the 
north-eastern states of Assam, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram 
and Arunachal Pradesh. The Act also offers impunity for the armed 
forces’ rape of women across the region. In July 2004 a young woman, 
Thangjam Manorama, was abducted, raped and killed by Indian security 
forces, who claimed she was a member of the banned People’s Liberation 
Army. It was this incident that gave rise to the remarkable act of protest 
by several Manipuri women who stood naked in front of the Indian 
Army’s base in Manipur, holding a banner that read ‘Indian Army, Rape 
Us’. By comparison with Kashmir, where human-rights violations by 
the Indian Army are widespread but relatively well-documented, mili-
tary operations in the north-east are protected by a thicker shroud of 
secrecy. The resulting culture of impunity has allowed sexual assault 
to proliferate, deepening the silence around gendered violence within 
the generally clannish tribal communities. In 2014 a young tribal girl 
from the East Garo hills of Meghalaya was found decapitated, burned 
and naked, having apparently been sexually violated by her stepfather 
for over a year; no prosecution followed. The region has also seen a 
rise in gang rape, but conviction rates remain dismally low. The mecha-
nisms are similar: shame and community sanctions for the families of 
raped women boost the impunity enjoyed by men in the region. The 
combined effect of a brutal counterinsurgency, which is now part of the 
fabric of everyday life, with militant resistance and few economic oppor-
tunities, has created an environment where sexual violence, trafficking 
and systematic abuse are endemic. The secondary-school drop-out rate 
in Meghalaya is 59 per cent, as young boys are forcibly recruited into 
the resistance, while girls are pressured into prostitution to service the 
troops. The violence in the region has created an echo chamber, giving 
rise to perverse notions of justice and righteousness: last year, twelve 
teenage girls were kidnapped and tortured by ‘activists’ for their involve-
ment in the sex trade.28
28 Meera Vijayann, ‘A Dangerous Silence in the Northeast’, Open Democracy, 
10 April 2015.
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The red threads running through these different episodes, whether in 
the context of caste wars, urban mobility or military occupation, are the 
impunity of India’s security forces and a legal system that consistently 
fails female victims. The largely upper-middle caste capture of local 
bureaucracies and police forces has long had punitive effects on women 
from marginalized communities, such as Dalit or tribal women. But 
the problem runs deeper. Pratiksha Baxi’s comprehensive indictment of 
India’s legal system reveals the profound complicity of the authorities 
with the perpetrators of gendered violence.29 Her ethnographic stud-
ies of rape trials show how the language of the courtroom obscures the 
actual violence, because of the scripts and conventions that victims are 
expected to follow, and the manner in which violence is expunged from 
the written record. Cases that make it through the legal system are sub-
ject to additional editing, raising the bar for what kinds of evidence can 
be admitted and taken into account. False medical reports or certificates 
are regularly admitted, defendants’ claims are rarely queried with any 
degree of rigour, and past sexual history is regularly admitted as a miti-
gating factor in the courtroom. 
Masculinity and aspiration
The growing surplus of unemployable young Indian men stands in 
ironic contrast to the cultural valuations of masculinity—celebrating 
the birth of a male child, the glorification of men’s sports and the 
persistence of male privilege in the public sphere. Indian ideals of 
masculinity have shifted, as the Gandhian asceticism originally appro-
priated by Hindu nationalism was decisively rejected by the new India. 
Studies of the ‘ideal’ male body in the era of the independence strug-
gle suggest that sexual emissions—and thus sex itself—were seen as 
depleting the energies of the Hindu male, leaving him powerless in the 
face of colonial invasion.30 Succumbing to desire weakened the body—
and the body politic; lust was ‘dirty’, ‘chaotic’ and dangerous. In their 
association of the sexual body with national power and glory, Hindu 
idealists were no different from political leaders elsewhere, who defined 
manliness as a precondition of political potency and command; here, 
29 Pratiksha Baxi, Public Secrets of Law: Rape Trials in India, Oxford 2013.
30 Joseph Alter, ‘Celibacy, Sexuality, and the Transformation of Gender into 
Nationalism in India’, Journal of Asian Studies, vol. 53, no. 1, 1994.
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however—in theory at least—it was not sexual prowess but abstinence 
that was the key to power. 
Since the 1980s, the bjp’s ascendancy and its shifting ideologies have 
embodied the contradictions of the ideal Hindu male in an era of 
Western consumerism and hedonism. While the old guard of the bjp, 
primarily those affiliated with the militant rss, still claim to uphold 
the ascetic tradition, the masses appear to have rejected the supposed 
Gandhian ideal of self-sufficiency, celibacy and semen retention. For the 
new, urban, middle-class India, hedonism, voyeurism and sexual prow-
ess are eternally emblazoned on the cities’ and highways’ larger-than-life 
billboards, in films and, not least, in a vast amount of pornography. India 
is the world’s fifth largest consumer of online porn—not such a surprise, 
given the size of its population, yet the relatively poor e-connectivity of 
rural India compared with China, for example, also needs to be taken 
into account.31 All this points to a release of libidinal energy after dec-
ades of prudery, leavened only by the occasional glimpse of Bollywood 
flesh. But this sexual ‘freedom’ is not only circumscribed by sharp gen-
der inequalities, reinforced by caste and ethnic domination; it has also 
produced a fierce reaction, which is directly threatening to women. The 
aspirational, gym-toned male body, with distinctly Western consumer 
tastes—whisky, cigarettes, fast cars—looms large on city billboards, 
enjoining men to participate in the image, if only vicariously. For India’s 
surplus men, fantasies fuelled by bootleg liquor are compounded by 
frustrated mobility and other forms of class desire. Notably, one of the 
four gang rapists in Delhi was a gym instructor; an aspirational but low-
paid occupation in India’s growing service industry, catering to the new 
body obsession. Drunk on cheap liquor, the four men drove round the 
city in one of the small, unregulated private buses that ply the streets. 
Their sadistic orgy, during which the young woman was assaulted with a 
rusty iron bar, seemed to encapsulate the madness of the new dispensa-
tion; the funnelling of historically honed aggression into a new capacity 
to wreak violence in the anomic, uncaring city. When Jyoti Singh was 
flung out of the bus, partially disembowelled and half-naked, passers-
by balked at helping her, as though they might be tainted by the sexual 
nature of the crime. 
31 Nor is this just for male consumers: Sunny Leone, a former porn star and now 
writer of adult novels for women, is the most googled name in India; her novella 
was released by a dedicated press via mobile phones—a first for the Subcontinent.
80 nlr 99
The Lancet reports that one in five women across the world experience 
some form of sexual violence, but we cannot know how much this fig-
ure reveals or conceals.32 Countries have different definitions of rape, 
which affects how data are aggregated. For example, in India marital 
rape is not an offence; Section 375 of the Indian penal code explicitly 
states that ‘sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not 
being under fifteen years of age, is not rape.’ As we have seen, one para-
dox of the statistics is that they may serve as a barometer of women’s 
confidence and determination, so that the rise in reports of rape may 
reflect shifting gender norms. In South Africa, for example, while sexual 
violence is considered to be at epidemic levels, perpetuated by ‘gangster’ 
youth culture and rural bride-capture alike, the statistical rise in reported 
rape may in part be attributed to the post-apartheid regime, under which 
black women feel safer reporting sexual crimes. Evidence suggests that 
assault was endemic during the apartheid era, with Johannesburg’s most 
popular daily, The Star, reporting twenty or thirty rapes every weekend 
in Soweto. The distrust of police during that period prevented the actual 
extent from emerging, so that most figures from that time are merely 
estimates. However, feminist activists in both India and South Africa 
have argued that sexual violence is still often internalized as normal by 
its victims, and is therefore less likely to be reported; this conclusion is 
backed by local research. While a 1999 survey in Johannesburg, Cape 
Town and Durban found that 71 per cent of women had experienced 
‘forced sexual intercourse’, another in southern Johannesburg showed 
that 59 per cent of women thought that a sexually violent man was more 
powerful, and 27 per cent of young women thought that forced sex is 
not sexual violence.33
South African feminists have questioned the extent to which working-
class men, in particular, have been further disenfranchised with the 
redefinition of gender roles and patriarchal ideologies following the end 
of apartheid. Emergent masculinities there have clearly been shaped by 
new forms of street and gang violence, following the daily coercions of 
32 Sarah Venis and Richard Horton, ‘Violence Against Women: A Global Burden’, 
The Lancet, 6 April 2002.
33 Sandra Bollen et al., Violence Against Women in Metropolitan South Africa: A Study 
on Impact and Service Delivery, Monograph no. 41, Institute for Security Studies, 
Pretoria 1999; Romi Sigsworth, ‘Anyone Can Be a Rapist: An Overview of Sexual 
Violence in Africa’, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, 2009.
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apartheid, and superimposed on the celebration of young male resist-
ance and radicalization after the Soweto uprising. As with caste and 
ethno-religious violence in India, the South African research highlights 
the ‘peacetime’ manifestation of group rape dynamics in moments of 
contested social and political transition. The brutal environment of rac-
ism and the experience of violence among young men in Soweto became 
associated with a style of masculinity embodied in the tsotsi, a figure at 
once anti-establishment and scornful of manual labour, who established 
power through sexual control. Kidnapping and abduction of women 
in Soweto during the 1980s was common practice. In contemporary 
urban townships, ‘streamlining’ is a form of rape seemingly oriented 
to conveying a message to ‘uptight’ or snobbish women, or even as a 
way of breaking up with a former girlfriend. If rape is performative, in 
these instances its symbolic function is aimed at conveying meaning not 
simply to the victim but to friends and enemies. But such rituals of mas-
culinity are not restricted to working-class men or gang members; they 
are also prevalent among white, middle-class young men in American 
college fraternities. Recent protests in Brazil against urban gang rape 
suggest a similar dimension.
Politics of representation
Western media coverage of the Delhi gang rape—commentators 
rushed to condemn women’s suffering in this ‘vast and misogynistic 
country’34—drew a defensive reaction from the self-conscious Indian 
middle class; global reactions to the atrocity threatened to tarnish India’s 
carefully cultivated image as a bric country on the rise. Certainly the 
politics of the story’s representation were highly selective about which 
nations were to be put in the spotlight, with most of the coverage choos-
ing to ignore the global prevalence of rape.35 Leslee Udwin’s exposure of 
the Subcontinent’s rape-tolerant culture in the film India’s Daughter was 
also dismissed by some Indian feminists as an attempt by ‘white women 
to save brown women’; they criticized the colonial mentality that charac-
terizes brown men as predators and brown women as victims. However, 
this gaze can be reversed: we need only look at the predatory activities 
34 Claire Cohen, ‘Delhi Gang-Rape Film: The Haunting Faces of India’s Hidden 
Women Were Revealed at Last’, Daily Telegraph, 5 March 2015.
35 World Health Organization, Global and Regional Estimates of Sexual Violence 
Against Women, Geneva 2013.
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of former imf chief Dominique Strauss-Kahn. Chandra Talpade 
Mohanty has suggested a more pointed critique of the ‘Western saviour’ 
perspective, showing that it creates a unitary Third World female subject 
who is above all a victim of patriarchy; this in turn serves to construct a 
Western feminist subject who is liberated, free of constraint, an agent 
of her own destiny. Instead, Mohanty has proposed a materialist under-
standing of gender subordination and violence, in the context of the 
global political economy and gender division of labour.36
There is evidence of a much wider feminist resistance in India, often far 
away from the urban middle-class movements that demonstrated after 
the Delhi gang rape. The naked protests outside the 17th Assam Rifles 
headquarters after Thangjam Manorama’s murder are part of a wider 
women’s movement. Rural Dalit women in Uttar Pradesh and Bihar 
organize a local-language weekly, Khabar Lahariya, which has publi-
cized rapes and domestic violence in the area. As Mohanty’s perspective 
suggests, gendered violence is intimately linked to the structural and 
cultural transformations of India over the past two decades, with 
their perceived threats to established forms of masculine power and 
their intensification of rivalries and frustrations. The issue then is not 
whether gendered violence is worse in this or that part of the world, but 
whether we can adequately grasp the forms in which the global politi-
cal economy of sexual violence manifests itself in particular places in 
particular ways. 
Whether in the transition from Nehruvian developmentalism to neo-
liberal economics, or from apartheid to the (equally neoliberal) anc 
regime, masculine domination persists in new forms. Women’s bodies 
are still the terrain on which battles for power may be waged, whether 
to punish them by the stigma of violence, or to claim them as plunder 
from the enemy. This is part of what Veena Das calls the ‘sexualized con-
tract’.37 The violence of these transitions, and of the material inequalities 
they involve, is closely related to that of sexual assault. Discussing the 
relative stasis of the sexual order in Masculine Domination, Bourdieu 
posed the question of what historical mechanisms were responsible for 
36 Chandra Talpade Mohanty, ‘Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and 
Colonial Discourses’, boundary 2, vol. 12, no. 1, 1984.
37 Veena Das, ‘Violence, Gender and Subjectivity’, Annual Review of Anthropology, 
vol. 37, 2008.
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the apparent dehistoricization of the sexual division—and pointed to 
the ‘labour of eternalization’ carried out by institutions such as the fam-
ily, organized religion, media and the state. To restore the relationship 
between the sexes ‘to historical action’ would involve, as an immediate 
objective, ‘neutralizing the mechanisms of the neutralization of history’, 
which eternalize sexed bodies and the social and political order in which 
they are placed. This meant undertaking a struggle for wholesale reform 
through collective action—in contrast both to the resignation encour-
aged by essentialist notions of difference, and to a resistance reduced to 
individual discursive acts.38 If the persistence of gendered violence is to 
be challenged, that path may be the best one to take.
38 Pierre Bourdieu, Masculine Domination, Cambridge 2001, pp. vii–viii.
